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gary.kessler@erau.edu

ABSTRACT
The Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash is commonly used as for integrity verification in the forensic
imaging process. The ability to force MD5 hash collisions has been a reality for more than a
decade, although there is a general consensus that hash collisions are of minimal impact to the
practice of computer forensics. This paper describes an experiment to determine the results of
imaging two disks that are identical except for one file, the two versions of which have different
content but otherwise occupy the same byte positions on the disk, are the same size, and have the
same hash value.
Keywords: MD5 hash collisions, forensic imaging, computer forensics, digital forensics

1. INTRODUCTION
The use of hash functions is widely used in
the practice of digital forensics to ensure the
integrity of files and the accuracy of forensic
imaging. The Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash
algorithm remains as one of the most
commonly used hashes in digital forensics
(Casey, 2011; Maras, 2015; Nelson, Phillips,
& Steuart, 2015).
Hash collisions -- i.e., the occurrence
where two files with different content have
the same hash value -- have been identified
in several well-known hash algorithms, in
particular MD5 (McHugh, 2014; Wang,
Feng, Lai, & Yu, 2004; Wang & Yu, 2005).
Hashes are used for a variety of applications,
including digital signature verification,
computer forensic image verification, user
identification and authentication, identifying
known good or bad files in a hashset, and
secure message exchange. The significance
and meaning of a third-party being able to
© 2016 ADFSL

force hash collisions is different for these
different applications; while forcing a hash
collision in an authentication application
could be quite serious, the impact might be
less damaging when identifying files in a
hashset (AccessData, 2006; Lewis, 2008;
Thompson, 2005). Nevertheless, the use of
hashing is so ingrained in digital forensics
training and practice that the impact of such
collisions in validating an evidentiary copy
continues to be discussed at conferences and
training sessions.
This paper will address the impact of
MD5 hash collisions on validating the results
of the computer forensics imaging process.
Section 2 will identify the specific problem of
hash collisions as it applies to imaging,
followed by a restatement of the problem as
a research question in Section 3. Section 4
will describe an experimental framework with
which to test the research hypothesis,
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followed by test results in Section 5. Section

2. PROBLEM
STATEMENT
The MD5 algorithm is described by Rivest
(1992) and its use to validate forensic images
is described in almost all computer forensics
textbooks, including Casey (2011), Maras
(2015), and Nelson et al. (2015). AccessData
(2006) and Thompson (2005), among others,
have suggested that MD5 hash collisions
have minimal impact on the results of
computer forensics examinations and, in
practice, can be ignored. However, training
in the computer forensics field for more than
a quarter century has emphasized the
importance of hashes as the key to proving
the integrity of a digital forensic copy -- i.e.,
an image -- almost to the exclusion of the
efficacy of training, experience, and the
forensic imaging tools (Cohen, 2013).
One nightmare scenario for law
enforcement, as a possible result of MD5 (or
other) hash collisions, is this: A prosecutor
introduces a set of N images of child sexual
assault as evidence at trial, complete with
the MD5 file hashes. The defense counters by
producing a set of N images of the defendant
on a dive boat in Aruba, complete with the
same set of MD5 hashes. If this situation was
possible, it can always be resolved,
presumably, by viewing the original images
on the evidentiary drive. However, the FUD
(fear, uncertainty, and doubt) Factor has
already been seeded and a good argument
might then be made that could cause a jury - or jurist -- to doubt the veracity and
integrity of even the original evidence
because the next obvious question is: If the
first set of (innocent) images has the same
hash values as the second set of (damning)
images, could not the second set of images
have been placed on the evidentiary disk by
an over-zealous prosecutor or investigator?
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6 will offer some conclusions.
It is well known that MD5 hash collisions
exist, although they have largely been forced
to occur in the laboratory (Burr, 2006;
Gutman, Naccache, & Palmer, 2005;
McHugh, 2014; Wang, Feng, Lai, & Yu,
2004; Wang & Yu, 2005). No one has yet
reported hash collisions occurring in
"nature;" that is, there are no reports of
finding two different files on a given disk
drive having the same MD5 hash. This is not
128
surprising, given that there are 2
(or
43
~10 ) possible MD5 hash values.
In digital forensics, we computer hash
values not only on the individual files but
also the entire disk that is being imaged. If
we have two files, A and B, that have the
same hash but are of different sizes, it is
clear that the image hash will be different
because there will be changes not only in the
file content but also in other parts of the
disk, such as allocated or unallocated space.
Indeed, the file system metadata -- e.g., the
file size in the directory entry as well as File
Allocation Table (FAT), $Bitmap, or inode
entries -- will also be different if the file sizes
differ.
The impact is less obvious if files A and
B are the same size because all of the file
system metadata might be unchanged. Thus,
is the nightmare scenario suggested above
actually possible? This could theoretically
only occur if one believes that the disk image
hash remains the same if all of the files on
the disk have the same hash. The experiment
described in this paper addresses this
question.

3. RESEARCH
QUESTION
The scenario mentioned in Section 2 can be
described as follows: Suppose one has two
files, A and B, that have different content

© 2016 ADFSL

The Impact of MD5 File Hash Collisions …
but are the same size and have the same
MD5 hash value. What is the effect on the
hash value of two disk images that differ
only in that one disk contains File A and the
other disk contains File B (where Files A and
B occupy the same location on the two disk
images)?
The research question is to test the
following null hypothesis (H0) as follows:
•

The resultant two disk images will
have the same hash value.

The alternative hypothesis (H1) is as
follows:
•

The resultant two disk images will
have different hash values.

4. EXPERIMENTAL
SETUP
To address the research questions, two files
were needed that were the same size, had the
same MD5 hash, and had different content.
Selinger (2011) provides such a pair of 128byte files, called hash1.bin and hash2.bin,
below:
hash1.bin
00000000:
00000010:
00000020:
00000030:
00000040:
00000050:
00000060:
00000070:
hash2.bin
00000000:
00000010:
00000020:
00000030:
00000040:
00000050:
00000060:
00000070:

d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70
d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c
2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89
55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a
085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b
d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6
dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0
e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e
c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70

The contents of the two files differ only
by six bits, shown above in the six bolded
nibbles. This is confirmed when executing
the fc (file compare) command against the
two files:
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00000013:
0000002D:
0000003B:
00000053:
0000006D:
0000007B:

87
71
F2
B4
A8
2B

07
F1
72
34
28
AB

10000111
01110001
11110010
10110100
10101000
00101011

00000111
11110001
01110010
00110100
00101000
10101011

While the two files have the same 128-bit
MD5 hash, it is worth noting that their 160bit Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) values
differ (Eastlake & Jones, 2001). This
confirms that the contents of the two files
are actually different and that there is a
bona fide MD5 hash collision:
File: hash1.bin
MD5 9054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4
SHA..A34473CF767C6108A5751A20971F1FDFBA97690A

File: hash2.bin
MD5
SHA

79054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4
4283DD2D70AF1AD3C2D5FDC917330BF502035658

A 32 MB thumb drive was used as the
test media. Using Windows 7, the thumb
drive was formatted using the format e:
/v:HASHTEST /p:1 command. This
initialized a FAT16 partition where the data
area was overwritten with zeroes. The
contents of the thumb drive were verified
using the WinHex (v18.6) hex editor.
Finally, a set of seven files were copied -- six
arbitrary files plus hash1.bin -- to the thumb
drive. The file list and hash values were:
File: 100_0230.JPG
MD5 097D23B541E4F58F03C57D410C3E3AD5
SHA EB916AF75CB5B5BB145F7C11DF17FEC2B04B4395
File: Charts_Navigation.pdf
MD5 4942439FA574809EEAFFF72989FE4276
SHA 6DF61583B57FE4832AD5929E14AFA10638836FA9
File: diveboat.jpg
MD5 91700649FD62204C3675A045142424E8
SHA B043E115E14C9EA3870D208526EEF300D4F4CCEC
File: hash1.bin
MD5 79054025255FB1A26E4BC422AEF54EB4
SHA A34473CF767C6108A5751A20971F1FDFBA97690A
File: IMG_1425.JPG
MD5 CB8FE970560AA6184ED1BC2EEC887681
SHA 8A37616C53CD53B1281B32889A07E29EAC99B09B
File: in_5615551872.flv
MD5 27DE3209E3B68414A7429E4104C22185
SHA 40E6AD48C728C4FF916E354B962FBA4B5C7C77A6
File: PICT0131_GCK.JPG
MD5 A9ABC3E926F93A03D4844323B21C513D
SHA C7FD4F3B8F743BF6202E6C57CC621A0EE6F5C6B5

Comparing files hash1.bin and hash2.bin
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5. TESTS AND RESULTS
Four tests were conducted on the media
described above. The results described in this
section are summarized in Table 1.
In Test #1, the thumb drive was imaged
using FTK Imager (v3.1.3.2). The purpose of
this test was merely to prepare a baseline
disk image and set of hash values. The image
verification MD5 hash of the thumb drive
was
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8
and the complete FTK Imager report can be
found in Appendix 1. The image was
examined with FTK (v1.81.6) and the file
listing showed the expected MD5 and SHA-1
hash values for the hash1.bin file (as shown
in Section 4).
For Test #2, the thumb drive was
mounted with WinHex and the contents of
hash1.bin were copied over the location
where hash1.bin resided on the thumb drive
(128 bytes starting at offset 0x6149). The
purpose of this test was to confirm that
overwriting data in this way was possible
and reliable. Note that it was not necessary
to change anything else on the thumb drive
since the two files were the same size; no
changes were necessary to the FAT table
entries or to the directory name, address, or
file size. The thumb drive was then reimaged. The image verification MD5 hash
was
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 -the same as in Test #1. This result confirms
that overwriting data in this way is an
adequate process and changes nothing else on
the drive. A portion of the FTK Imager
report can be found in Appendix 2. The FTK
file listing showed the expected MD5 and
SHA-1 hash values for the hash1.bin file.
For Test #3, the thumb drive was
mounted in WinHex and the contents of
hash2.bin were copied over the location
Page 132
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where hash1.bin resided on the thumb drive.
This test was really the crux of the
hypothesis experiment since hash2.bin is the
"hash-equivalent, content-different" file to
hash1.bin. The thumb drive was re-imaged,
yielding an image verification MD5 hash of
8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4 -different than Tests #1 and #2. A portion of
the FTK Imager report can be found in
Appendix 3. The FTK file listing showed the
expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for
the hash2.bin file.
For Test #4, the thumb drive was
mounted with WinHex and the contents of
hash1.bin were copied back over the location
where hash2.bin now resided on the thumb
drive. The purpose of this test was to restore
the drive to its original state and confirm
that Test #3 changed nothing more than the
128 bytes where the test data resided. The
fourth image verification MD5 hash was
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 -the same as Tests #1 and #2. This result
confirms that Test #4 had restored the disk
to its initial state and that Test #3 changed
nothing more than the file data. A portion of
the FTK Imager report can be found in
Appendix 4. The FTK file listing showed the
expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for
the hash1.bin file.

6. CONCLUSIONS
The image verification MD5 hashes in Tests
#1, #2, and #4 -- images that each held the
hash1.bin content -- had the same value,
whereas the image verification MD5 hash
value in Test #3 -- when the image held the
hash2.bin content -- was different from the
other tests. The fact that Tests #1, #2, and
#4 had the same hash proved that the test
process worked as desired; the fact that Test
#3 had a different result shows that the hash
value of the imaged drive depends upon the
actual bit content of the entire drive. Since
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the hash values of the two images are not the
same, the null hypothesis (H0) is disproven
and the alternate hypothesis (H1) is proven.
If the hash value of the disk were a
function of the hashes of the individual
components of the disk's contents, then one
would expect to find the disk image
unchanged when the files were substituted,
meaning that the "nightmare scenario" could
be realized. If the hash of the disk, however,
were just based upon the bits on the disk,
the two image hashes would be different
when the files were exchanged, meaning that
the scenario could not actually be
perpetrated in this way.
Disproving the null hypothesis, then, is
the expected result because the hash value of
a disk image is supposed to be based upon
the bit contents of the disk rather than the
hashes of the individual files -- including file
system structures and unallocated space -that compose the disk contents. Thus, even if
all of the file hashes on two disks are the
same, the disk image hashes will be different
if the contents of the files are different.
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Given this result, the scenario described in
Section 2 cannot be realized.
It is hoped that this result will lay the
concern about file hash collisions to rest as
they apply to digital forensic imaging. As
long as both individual files and the entire
image are hashed, the theoretical occurrence
of individual file collisions is not a factor in
confirming the evidentiary integrity of a
forensic copy.
As noted above, the SHA-1 hash values
are different for the hash1.bin and hash2.bin
files, although SHA-1 collisions are also
theoretically possible (Stevens, Karpman, &
Peyrin, 2015; Stevens et al., 2017). Since the
MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms are different, the
manipulation that can create an MD5
collision cannot create a SHA-1 collision and,
to date, no one has yet shown a practical
method with which to cause both an MD5
and SHA-1 collision in the same file. The
results of the experiment reported in this
paper, however, suggests that it would not
matter since a file hash collision will still
result in different image file hashes.

Table 1.
Summary of the four tests and the results.

Description of Test
#1 - Drive with hash1.bin file at bytes 0x6149-0x61C8
#2 - Overwrite bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 with hash1.bin
#3 - Overwrite bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 with hash2.bin
#4 - Overwrite bytes 0x6149-0x61C8 with hash1.bin

NOTE
All FTK Imager reports, FTK reports, and
ancillary files are available for examination
at
http://www.garykessler.net/gck/hash_test.zi
p.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: FTK Imager report for Test #1
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2
Case Information:
Acquired using: ADI3.1.3.2
Case Number: Hash Test
Evidence Number: 1
Unique Description:
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash1.bin
-------------------------------------------------------------Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test1:
Physical Evidentiary Item (Source) Information:
[Device Info]
Source Type: Physical
[Drive Geometry]
Cylinders: 3
Tracks per Cylinder: 255
Sectors per Track: 63
Bytes per Sector: 512
Sector Count: 62,719
[Physical Drive Information]
Drive Model: SanDisk Cruzer Mini USB Device
Drive Serial Number:
Drive Interface Type: USB
Removable drive: True
Source data size: 30 MB
Sector count:
62719
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8
SHA1 checksum:
169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1
Image Information:
Acquisition started:
Mon Jun 20 19:37:47 2016
Acquisition finished: Mon Jun 20 19:37:52 2016
Segment list:
C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test1.E01
Image Verification Results:
Verification started: Mon Jun 20 19:37:52 2016
Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:37:52 2016
MD5 checksum:
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 : verified
SHA1 checksum:
169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 : verified

Appendix 2: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #2
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2
Case Number: Hash Test 2
Evidence Number: 2
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash1.bin (overwritten)
-------------------------------------------------------------Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test2:
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8
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SHA1 checksum:
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169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1

Image Information:
Acquisition started:
Mon Jun 20 19:40:24 2016
Acquisition finished: Mon Jun 20 19:40:29 2016
Segment list:
C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test2.E01
Image Verification Results:
Verification started: Mon Jun 20 19:40:29 2016
Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:40:29 2016
MD5 checksum:
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 : verified
SHA1 checksum:
169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 : verified

Appendix 3: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #3
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2
Case Number: Hash Test
Evidence Number: 3
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash2.bin overwrite
-------------------------------------------------------------Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test3:
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:
8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4
SHA1 checksum:
177774eefa63b5e67c04a2e9d2d875e2353400df
Image Information:
Acquisition started:
Mon Jun 20 19:43:14 2016
Acquisition finished: Mon Jun 20 19:43:18 2016
Segment list:
C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test3.E01
Image Verification Results:
Verification started: Mon Jun 20 19:43:18 2016
Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:43:18 2016
MD5 checksum:
8045e3c1d5a44eeb5297447b85ecada4 : verified
SHA1 checksum:
177774eefa63b5e67c04a2e9d2d875e2353400df : verified

Appendix 4: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #4
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2
Case Number: Hash Test
Evidence Number: 4
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash1.bin re-written
-------------------------------------------------------------Information for C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test4:
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:
d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8
SHA1 checksum:
169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1
Image Information:
Acquisition started:
Mon Jun 20 19:45:52 2016
Acquisition finished: Mon Jun 20 19:45:57 2016
Segment list:
C:\Users\gck\Desktop\hash_test\Test4.E01
Image Verification Results:
Verification started: Mon Jun 20 19:45:57 2016
Verification finished: Mon Jun 20 19:45:57 2016
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MD5 checksum:
SHA1 checksum:
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d1fdd4a0019fbedcd4459b51633ad9b8 : verified
169d0f1972364d65760f17fc49838cc27ba378f1 : verified
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